Conflict in REDD+: An analysis of sources of conflict based on case studies from South and Southeast Asia
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RECOFTC aims to better understand forest conflict, including the causes, the impacts, and the management options for conflict transformation. For this we analyze the disputes, relevant policies, forestry programs, and regulatory frameworks. This knowledge is used to raise awareness and develop the capacity of all stakeholders to contribute to preventing, mitigating and managing conflict. Our research is continuously mainstreamed in our training courses, which help develop the knowledge, and the skills of conflict management practitioners.

When it comes to forest conflict, prevention is better than a cure. RECOFTC advocates participatory forest-management approaches, especially community forestry, as essential strategies for reducing and transforming forest conflict in the region. Our thematic programs use analysis, training, advocacy, and networking towards participatory resource management and, thus, contribute to helping transform forest conflicts.

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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSAB</td>
<td>Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Community Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFUG</td>
<td>Community Forest User Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELC</td>
<td>Economic Land Concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Forestry Administration, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>Forest Department, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECOFUN</td>
<td>Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPIC</td>
<td>Free, Prior and Informed Consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Indigenous Community Commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIMOD</td>
<td>International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOECAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOM</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTFPs</td>
<td>Non Timber Forest Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Payment for Ecosystem Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFES</td>
<td>Payment for Forest Environmental Services, Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOFTC</td>
<td>Regional Community Forestry Training Center – The Center for People Forests</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Safeguard Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>The Seima Protection Forest, Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-REDD</td>
<td>United Nations – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCS</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
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</table>
Executive summary

Background
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks) is intended to provide financial incentives as well as co-benefits for forest stakeholders in developing countries to reduce their carbon emissions through avoided deforestation, conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. However, with the complexity of forest and land management in many tropical countries, there are concerns that implementing REDD+ may incur significant risks, including introducing conflict.

Based on empirical case studies in four countries in South (Nepal) and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Myanmar and Viet Nam), this issue paper examines how REDD+ can be a driver of conflict (and cooperation), particularly between forest communities, governments and REDD+ project developers, as well as between and within communities and within national government agencies. The paper aims to flag issues (such as increased restrictions on forest access by local communities) that need greater attention regarding conflict and cooperation from the development and implementation of REDD+ as well as put forward recommendations to key stakeholders to ensure that REDD+ succeeds in providing real opportunities for achieving sustainable forest management in a region where deforestation, rural poverty and land use conflicts are a significant challenge.

To identify sources of conflict relating to REDD+, this paper draws on a ‘sources of impairment’ framework which was developed for increasing the understanding and facilitating the sustainable management (i.e. transformation) of natural resource conflicts, including those resulting from the development and implementation of REDD+. The sources of impairment are:

1. Access and use restriction;
2. Benefit distribution;
3. Competing demands;
4. Conflict management capacity;
5. Leadership;
6. Legal and policy frameworks;
7. Participation and information;
8. Quality of resources; and
9. Tenure security.

Findings: The potential for conflict in the REDD+ sites
The findings indicate that most of the sources of impairment are present in all the study sites. The issues relating to restricted access to forest resources, competing demands, benefit sharing and unclear tenure were the most common sources of impairment identified in the sites. Some of these issues already exist in the REDD+ sites and have been the main drivers of conflict prior to the development of REDD+. However, the findings show that in some sites, REDD+ is an increasing impairment for some stakeholders, particularly forest communities, for example, by imposing further restrictions on access to forest resources. This occurs against the backdrop of other external pressures and competing interests over forest and forestland by, for example, mining, logging and plantation development as well as socio-economic changes such as migration, population growth and rural infrastructure development.

In terms of conflict and its transformation, the REDD+ readiness proposals or roadmaps in the four countries studied have recognized the potential threat of conflict posed by REDD+ activities and stipulate a plan / strategy to prevent the conflicts, redress grievances and address conflicts in their projects. However, the proposed grievance mechanisms outlined in the project documents are still in the early stages of development and are too general. Other studies have also found that most conflicts in the study sites are still being handled in an ad-hoc manner, rather than through employing systematic and/or institutionalized mechanisms. There is also the lack of a clear strategy to improve conflict transformation capacity and coordination among REDD+ stakeholders.

While this paper has identified potential sources of conflict in REDD+ sites, it also found that some approaches introduced by REDD+ may reduce the likelihood of conflict, this includes increased participation of traditionally marginalized groups. REDD+ has also contributed to reduce potential conflict drivers in some REDD+ sites through improved clarity of tenure. Finally, the current development of grievance redress mechanisms (although still in their early stage of development) in the four countries as well as the implementation of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) are likely to have positive contributions to reduce conflicts in and around REDD+ sites, and transform them when they do occur.
Lessons learned and ways forward
Based on the findings, the following recommendations are proposed, particularly to effectively address the causes of conflict (the existing and potential ones), increase the effectiveness of forest management, and generally to increase the potential of REDD+ as a catalyst for social transformation and sustainable forest management:

- Ensuring appropriate incentives are in place for the engagement and participation of local communities in REDD+ processes at the national and subnational levels.
- Ensuring that those who are dependent on the forest resources and services for their livelihoods benefit directly from REDD+.
- Ensuring effective implementation of REDD+ safeguards, particularly ensuring the grievance redress and conflict transformation mechanisms in place are clear and accessible.
- Strengthening capacity of key REDD+ stakeholders to anticipate and transform conflict.
- Assessing, clarifying and reforming tenure arrangements over forests and forestland, and ensuring there is a strong appropriate tenure foundation for REDD+.
- Developing, clarifying and providing sufficient information regarding benefit sharing mechanisms through participatory processes at local, subnational and national levels, drawing on models and experiences piloted elsewhere.
- Improving coordination between government agencies and other stakeholders in REDD+ implementation and continuously ensuring full and equitable participation of local communities in the coordination mechanisms.
Acknowledgements

The issue paper was made possible by the support from The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), as well as through the “Conflict and cooperation over REDD+ in Mexico, Nepal and Viet Nam” (CoCooR) project, funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).

We are indebted to the local communities and other local and national stakeholders who contributed to the work, to the participants of the regional expert workshop for their feedback in our research framework, as well as to the REDD+ project developers in all study sites (Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal and Viet Nam) for their support and cooperation.

The following organizations and individuals have contributed in the development of this study: Cambodian Center for Mediation (Cambodia), Forest Action (Nepal), Da Lat University (Viet Nam), Yurdi Yasmi, Toral Patel, Savath Meas, Thanak Gnann, Kyaw Moe Aung, Naya Sharma Paudel, Harisharan Luintel, Dil B. Khatri, Hoang Cam, Lâm Ngọc Tuấn, Ngô Xuân Huấn, Nguyễn Thị Như Thúy, and Lâm Văn Hà. We are grateful for their collaboration in developing the case studies upon which this paper is built.

We also thank our colleagues in RECOFTC Cambodia Country Program, Myanmar Country Program, Nepal Country Program, and Viet Nam Country Program, as well as the Strategic Communication Unit for their support. Finally we are extremely grateful to the invaluable advice from the external reviewers, namely Poshendra Satyal, Pham Thu Thuy and Donal Yeang, on an earlier version of this report.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks) has been one of the key topics in the international negotiations on climate change such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The initiative was consolidated in UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali in 2007 and has been considered a potentially highly cost-effective way to cut greenhouse gas emissions from the forestry sector (e.g. Stern 2006). It is envisaged that this would be achieved through providing financial incentives for countries, projects, or communities to reduce their emissions through avoiding deforestation, enhancing carbon stocks, and by ultimately sustainably managing their forests (Angelsen 2009, Knox et al. 2011, Venter et al. 2012). This is largely based on the fact that land use and land use change (mainly through deforestation and forest degradation) have contributed between 10-20 per cent of global CO2 emissions (IPCC 2014).

REDD+ initiatives have attracted support, from a wide range of stakeholders including government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, donor agencies, as well as the private sector and academics. REDD+ has the potential to mobilize billions of dollars in multilateral and bilateral funding for developing countries (Phelps et al. 2010). In addition to the financial benefits, REDD+ is also expected to bring significant co-benefits such as poverty alleviation, securing rights and equity, improving forest governance, and protecting biodiversity, soil and water quality (Brown et al. 2008). For its proponents, REDD+ and other similar payments for ecosystem services (PES) initiatives are considered win-win solutions for both the environment and people; it can help conserve forests and ecosystems, and at the same time provides monetary and nonmonetary rewards for the stakeholders (Sikor 2013).

A variety of stakeholders with different and often competing interests and values over forest resources may become involved in REDD+ projects. Potential REDD+ beneficiaries, in addition to the global population who will benefit from mitigated climate change, will include: providers of REDD+ services (e.g. forest communities, indigenous people, smallholders), village associations and community groups, municipal/local governments and agencies, project developers/implementers (local or subnational), and central governments (Luttrell et al. 2012).

With the current complexity of issues facing forestland management especially in developing countries (e.g. weak forest governance, unclear tenure), combined with significant and varying interests of the REDD+ stakeholders, it is understandable that there is a great deal of concern that REDD+ will be contentious and potentially exacerbate existing and new conflicts (e.g. Yasmi et al. 2012, Patel et al. 2013, Gritten et al. 2013). Possible adverse impacts of REDD+ have been anticipated and led to the establishment of REDD+ “safeguards” within UNFCCC decisions, particularly in the Cancun Agreement (Peskett and Todd 2013), the intention of which was to ensure that the actions taken by governments and donors pursuing REDD+ initiatives do not cause social and environmental damage (UNFCCC 2011, Arhin 2014). However, the safeguards are still viewed as being poorly defined, for example different stakeholder groups with different forest management objectives may interpret these differently and promote different forms of safeguards (e.g. McDermott 2012, Jagger et al. 2014).

Given the importance of REDD+ and its potential to affect hundreds of millions of forest-dependent people in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential to identify and anticipate the potential impacts of its design and implementation on forest management and governance, with implications for forest conflicts and how they are addressed. While rigorous research into conflict is a cornerstone of successful conflict transformation (e.g. Gritten et al. 2009, RECOFTC 2014a, Dhiaulhaq et al. 2015) there are few studies to date that focus specifically on conflict in REDD+. This paper aims to identify possible
constraints, referred to here as sources of impairment, that may result in exacerbating existing, and creating new conflicts, regarding the development and implementation of REDD+, but also forest land resource management in general. Beyond that, this work also discusses how REDD+ can be a tool for maximizing the positive outcomes from conflict when it arises (i.e. conflict transformation).

1.2 Scope and approach

This issue paper presents an analysis of potential conflict resulting from REDD+ in four countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal and Viet Nam). The primary aim of the work is to build an understanding of the relationship between REDD+ and conflict over forests, land and resources, and in particular, to identify possible areas of conflict due to REDD+ implementation. The analysis was guided by the following questions:

1. How does REDD+ introduce new areas of conflict and/or exacerbate existing ones?
2. How can REDD+ be a tool for conflict transformation?

The study can inform current and future development of REDD+ and also management of forests and natural resources in general. This study also draws lessons from other forest governance approaches and initiatives to provide critical insights on how to prevent and transform conflict in REDD+ design, implementation and monitoring.

Primary data was collected through fieldwork in a total of nine sites in the four countries (Figure 1 and Table 1). The sites were selected based on criteria including presence, or potential presence, of REDD+ activity, occurrence of forest conflict in or around the area, accessibility of the sites, and cost effectiveness.

The fieldwork was conducted in blocks between April 2011 and November 2014. In total, 296 semi-structured interviews and 47 focus group discussions (FGDs) involving 445 respondents were conducted with representatives from local communities, government officials, NGOs and REDD+ networks. Furthermore, in total five expert workshops were convened in the four countries (two were held in Nepal) as part of the study involving in total 71 participants from relevant government departments, research institutes, implementing agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs).

Figure 1. Location of the case studies

Table 1. Description of case study sites
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| **Cambodia:**  
Keo Seima District | The work in Cambodia was conducted in Seima Protection Forest (SPF), which is located in eastern Cambodia, predominantly in Mondulkiri Province with a small area extending into Kratie Province. The SPF is a remote forested area of 292,690 hectares, divided into a Core Protection Forest Area and two Buffer Protection Forest Areas. SPF is home to 20 villages (roughly 5,000 people) of mainly Bunong ethnic communities who have been living in the area for hundreds of years. The residents of these villages depend upon resources inside the SPF for their livelihoods, particularly for farming of cash crops, non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as resin, and subsistence shifting agriculture.  
Among the 20 villages of six communes, seven villages (Pu Char, O Chrar, Pu Kong and Gati in Sre Preah Commune, Sre Khoutum in Sre Khutm Commune, Pu Haim in Sen Monorom Commune) were selected for the study sites. The selection was based on the villages having registered communal land titles (O-Chrar and Gati), and villages with private land titles (Pu Char and Sre Khutm) or in process of getting land titles (Pu Kong and Pu Haim).  
Cambodia developed its REDD+ Readiness Plan (the ‘roadmap’) in 2010, signed a UN-REDD National Programme and started the inception period in 2011. In addition to SPF, Cambodia also has two other pilot REDD+ projects (Oddar Meanchey and Kulen Promtep). |
| **Myanmar:**  
Hkamti District  
Pyapon District  
Taungoo District | In Myanmar the work was conducted in three sites. The first site is in Yedashay township, Taungoo District in Bago region, in which the Forest Department conducted REDD+ pilot projects with the Korean Forest Service. The second site was in Hkamti Township, Hkamti District, Sagaing Region. The area is a potential REDD+ project site for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is funded by the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund for a rights based approach for indigenous people living in the Hkamti Township. The third site was selected to study the various issues on the successful community forest management at Pyapon Township, Pyapon District, Ayeyarwaddy Region. While the last site is not a REDD+ site, it was selected on the basis of it being a community forest that appears to be successfully addressing the drivers of deforestation. Additionally, all three sites were selected because they are project sites for the RECOFTC coordinated Grassroots Capacity Building for REDD+ project.  
Myanmar joined the UN-REDD Programme in November 2011. Discussions on how the UN-REDD Programme could support Myanmar had already begun in 2010, and Myanmar had attended several UN-REDD regional meetings. Its REDD+ readiness roadmap was published in 2013. |
| **Nepal:**  
Chitwan District  
Gorkha District  
Dolakha District | In Nepal, three REDD+ pilot sites were selected for this study: Kayarkhola (Chitwan District), Ludhikola (Gorkha District) and Charnawati (Dolakha District) watersheds. The REDD+ projects were initiated by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources (ANSAB), and the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) in 2009. At the time of data collection, the three pilot projects were testing community forest-based governance and payment mechanisms for REDD+.  
The government of Nepal began a dialogue on REDD+ readiness and submitted the REDD Readiness Plan Idea Note to the World Bank in March 2008, not long after UNFCCC COP 13 in Bali in 2007. After the Note was approved, the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation (MoFSC) established the REDD Forestry and Climate Change Cell (REDD Cell), an administrative unit, in January 2009 to prepare the Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP), which was approved by Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank in 2010 (Paudel et al. 2013). The REDD Cell is now renamed as “REDD Implementation Center” and is mandated to be a lead institution to undertake REDD+ readiness activities in Nepal. Nepal has also been a member of the UN-REDD Programme since 2010. |
| **Viet Nam:**  
Di Linh District  
Lam Ha District | The Viet Nam case studies build on UN-REDD Programme pilot activities in two districts: Di Linh and Lam Ha in Lam Dong province. In each district, two communes in which the UN-REDD Programme carried out its communication activities on REDD+, and two communes without UN-REDD Programme’s communication activities on REDD+ were selected for comparison. Among the four communes studied, two communities were mainly comprised of the K’Ho ethnic group, one mainly of the Kinh group and the remaining made up mixed ethnic groups.  
Viet Nam was selected to participate in the UN-REDD Programme based on the acceptance of its National Programme Document prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Vietnamese government. Viet Nam officially entered the inception and implementation phase of REDD+ in September 2009, moving into the second phase of the programme in 2013. |
1.3 Structure of paper

The findings of the case studies and analysis are summarized in five sections of this issue paper. Section 1 provided a general background of the study, its scope and approaches. Section 2 explains the conceptual and analytical frameworks for data collection and analysis. Section 3 presents the findings (i.e. sources of impairments) from each case study guided by the analytical framework. Section 4 interprets the results as well as their implications and recommendation for conflict management in REDD+ development and implementation. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF IMPAIRMENT

2.1 Defining conflict and conflict transformation

In this paper, “conflict” is defined as a situation in which one or more party pursues goals and interests through behavior or actions that impairs another party (Glasl 1999). Conflicts over forests and land manifest at different levels of intensity, from a latent conflict which, if not addressed properly, can manifest and escalate to become destructive and violent (Engel and Korf 2005). A conflict is latent when it is not open but has the potential to escalate, while manifest conflict is more open, with direct confrontation and is a public issue (Engel and Korf 2005).

When addressing conflict, practitioners should strive to ensure that the outcomes of their efforts are sustainable, in other words transformative. Conflict transformation is understood as a process for addressing conflict, whereby the negative relationship dynamics between parties are addressed, while promoting conditions that create long-term cooperation and justice. Therefore through this process one can view conflict as an opportunity and catalyst for social change, aiming not only to halt the conflict but also to change from the negative or destructive to positive and constructive interaction by empowering parties, and facilitating shifts in their relations (Reimann, 2004; Bush and Folger 2005).

Usually when talking of addressing conflict, parties use the terms “conflict resolution” and “conflict management.” While it is defined variably in the literature, the term conflict resolution comes with the assumption that conflict is negative and therefore should be resolved and ended, often indicated by achievement of mutually acceptable agreement between conflict parties. Resolution often does not necessarily entail addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Conflict management comes with the assumption that conflict is complex and can never be resolved entirely, and therefore the approach works to manage the conflict by avoiding destructive escalation and attaining some positive outcomes for all parties (Kriesberg, 1998; Reimann, 2004). Regarding natural resource and forestry conflicts involving local communities in South and Southeast Asia, RECOFTC believes a transformative approach is necessary given the prevailing structural contexts.

2.2 Sources of impairment framework

To facilitate the identification of the possible sources of impairment in the conflict sites, this paper uses an analytical framework developed earlier by RECOFTC (Patel et al. 2013). The framework is based on aforementioned Glasl's (1999) definition of conflict, and can be used to locate possible sources of impairment and thus the likelihood of conflict. This analytical framework consists of nine possible sources of impairment in the context of natural resource management (Table 2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Examples of impairment</th>
<th>Justification for the REDD+ context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Access and use restriction</td>
<td>Regulations limiting local stakeholders’ access to or use of forests due to creation of protected forest areas and/or granting of land concessions to private companies</td>
<td>Access to natural resources is essential in meeting subsistence needs of local stakeholders. Policies or practices that limit local access and ability to harvest forest products can cause conflict. REDD+ may come with such restrictions that have potential to alter the relationship that people have with forests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Benefit distribution</td>
<td>Unclear or inequitable arrangements for distributing benefits from forest management</td>
<td>The lack of fair and equitable benefit distribution mechanisms may create hostility among stakeholders regarding benefit sharing. The introduction of new resources into the system as well as potential benefits from REDD+ must be factored into this already complex equation of benefit generation and distribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Competing demands</td>
<td>Overlap between economic and development agendas, conservation, and cultural importance of forest areas</td>
<td>Prioritization of conservation or economic development agenda over cultural values as well as local needs and aspirations makes natural resource management (NRM) highly contentious. Alternative land use options might generate more income, making REDD+ the less favorable option to communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conflict management capacity</td>
<td>Lack of capacity, support or resources from local or central government for managing conflict</td>
<td>The lack of a clear and effective mechanism or process for managing conflict over forestland and resources may escalate conflict. Ongoing tensions can undermine existing institutions, increase the socioeconomic vulnerability of dependent users, and result in environmental degradation. The absence of grievance mechanisms or processes challenging conventional decision-making processes, like Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), could make REDD+ itself a driver for conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership is not representative, accountable, or transparent; elite groups dominate decision-making processes and bodies</td>
<td>Community elites often exert disproportionate influence on leadership positions. Their elevated social status enables them to circumvent accountability or transparency, and misuse their leadership roles to engage in corrupt practices. The approach to and content of REDD+ implementation may strengthen these prevalent power imbalances or cause conflict by challenging them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Legal and policy frameworks</td>
<td>Dominance of state law over local and/or customary traditions; multiple, ambiguous and overlapping regulations related to forest management; legislation not well understood or effectively enforced</td>
<td>Effective forest management depends on the clarity and consistency of legal and policy frameworks. State regulations often do not explicitly accommodate customary laws or reflect local realities. The resulting legal pluralism can create conflict. Inadequate provisions for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programs likewise contribute to legal instability. The commoditization of carbon through REDD+ will add complexity to existing regulatory frameworks for forest management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Participation and information</td>
<td>Lack of understanding and access to information, limited opportunities for stakeholders to meaningfully participate in forest management</td>
<td>State forest policies and interventions are sometimes made without active participation of local stakeholders, and thereby fail to account for local rights and practices. Inadequate consultation and communication with stakeholder groups can lead to conflict. Even where REDD+ implementation is equipped with grievance mechanisms and processes to ensure that affected parties understand and agree with the implications, the use of such tools is not foolproof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Quality of resources</td>
<td>Actual and perceived decrease or increase in the condition of forest resources caused by an external actor</td>
<td>Decreases in amount or quality of available forestland and resources can create tensions among stakeholders. The pursuit of REDD+ benefits may lead to intentionally skewed perceptions of forest quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tenure security</td>
<td>Overlapping boundaries between state and CF, contested boundaries, lack of recognition of customary rights and traditional uses of the land</td>
<td>The lack of clear and consistent recognition of stakeholders’ claims to forestland and resources can fuel conflict. Such recognition could afford stakeholders rights to manage, control and utilize resources. In practice, however, tenure arrangements are vaguely defined or absent, leading to overlapping claims between state and CF. This is especially true where customary and traditional rights are concerned. REDD+ poses important questions about carbon ownership and benefit entitlements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Patel et al. 2013)
3. FINDINGS: THE POTENTIAL OF CONFLICT IN THE REDD+ STUDY SITES

In the following sections, we present the main findings from the case studies by presenting the different sources of impairments from the four countries. Since there are often overlaps between the different sources of impairments in some countries as well as repetitions, in some of the sources of impairment not all the countries are presented.

3.1 ACCESS AND USE RESTRICTION

The findings from the four countries indicate that while in some cases restrictions on access and use of forest resources prior to REDD+ have existed (e.g. in conservation areas or areas designated for land concessions), REDD+ re-enforced or imposed further restrictions on access to forest resources, further constraining the freedom that local people previously enjoyed.

In some cases, the restrictions have resulted in corresponding negative impacts on people's livelihoods and disrupted traditional practices (e.g. traditional shifting farming). In Nepal and Cambodia, rural forest dependent poor and vulnerable groups, such as women, have suffered most from these changes. Some alternative livelihood development programs, as found in the Cambodian site, may help local communities to cope with this restriction while also reducing pressure on the forest.

Cambodia

The REDD+ project site in Seima is settled by more than 11,000 indigenous ethnic minority people who largely depend on forest resources. Since the site's categorization changed from Production to Protection Forest in 2009 activities such as cutting and clearing forest, hunting, building infrastructure (e.g. housings, roads) as well as commercial extraction and agricultural activities are strictly prohibited within the core of the Seima Protection Forest (SPF) Area. However, referring to the 2002 Forestry Law, the Forestry Administration (FA) and WCS stated that traditional rights of local people are always respected, especially for the purpose of traditional customs, spiritual and basic living.

Women villagers at Gati and Sre Khtum stated that since being designated as a protection forest their traditional land use practices have been restricted (e.g. shifting agriculture) because extended forestland clearance is not allowed in the protected forest area. Moreover, in Sre Khtum and Pu Char villages, the collection of resin and timber for house construction are more limited and additional pressure comes from the concession companies surrounding the forest that further restrict the access and extraction of forest resources.

After the series of FPIC processes (Table 3) in the participating villages, the agreements on the 'Cooperative Implementation of the REDD+ project' in SPF were signed by the FA and local communities in 2012. The community's access to and use of forest products are determined according to this agreement. Collection of timber products and NTFPs are allowed only for subsistence needs, with collection of timber for house building, for example, requiring permission of the FA. The community is also required to cooperate in developing and following the land-use plans, management plans and other sustainable resource-use agreements. While the agreement has followed the prescribed processes of FPIC, some local indigenous people continue to express concerns that REDD+ may introduce stricter rules that limit their rights to extract forest resources for their subsistence needs and manage the forestland. This is against the backdrop of the occurrence of other pressures from illegal logging and land concessions by outsiders near to the REDD+ project site, which causes loss or damage to many resources such as farmland, resin trees, and herbal plants which are normally used by local villagers for subsistence purposes or income generation. Additionally, despite progress in tenure, challenges that jeopardize income security still remain (Baird 2014).
In order to reduce pressure on forests and improve local livelihoods in 2006 the FA and WCS in collaboration with a local NGO (Cambodian Rural Development Team (CRDT)) piloted an alternative livelihood development project in Andoung Kraloeng Village. The project included training on improved agricultural techniques and small-scale agricultural production for sale in local markets, which was subsequently scaled up for other villages. The CRDT claims the implementation of the project increased household incomes by US$30-70 a year on average (10-15 per cent increase) while the average time spent collecting forest products decreased from about 8.7 days to 3.8 days a month.

**Myanmar**

In the two potential REDD+ sites, Hkamti and Taungoo, villagers historically access and use the forest resources in their daily lives to get water, fish, animals and forest products for their subsistence needs without any particular restriction. Even though the Forest Law and Protection of Wildlife and Protected Areas Law are in place, it is obvious that law enforcement is weak in the area. This is exemplified by the occurrence of small scale illegal logging and agricultural land expansion in the reserved forest and protected forest area by rural poor peoples who subside off these activities.

Many community members in both sites express concern that their traditional access and use rights are threatened. This is linked to the fact that, for example, the Ministry of Mines (MOM) designated a large tract of land as a jade mining area at Hkamti Township without consulting the villagers who traditionally use the forest and reside within the area. Additionally, Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MOECAF) has formulated a policy relating to enhancement of private sector through private forest plantation investment in 2005. The establishment of private plantations in Bago region was also done, according to some community members, without appropriate consultation leading to the loss of access to forest resources in the area which was formerly used by local communities. The local communities are also concerned about what they see as significant reduction of forest area available for their livelihood (e.g. for shifting cultivation) and have to look for new lands in the remaining protected areas or reserved forests.

**Nepal**

In the Nepal case study sites, following the implementation of the REDD+ pilot project, the Executive Committees of the Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) placed restrictions on the extraction of forest products such as fuelwood and fodder as well as livestock grazing activities. REDD+ piloting also appeared to have encouraged CFUG leaders to increase efforts to enforce and monitor the restriction. The restriction mainly affects forest dependent communities who have no alternative source of energy and substitutes for these forest products. Following the release of the first REDD+ payments (i.e. Forest Carbon Trust Fund (FCTF)), restrictions on collecting grass, leaves and fodder were reduced, but livestock grazing was still strictly prohibited due to potential damage to seedlings and trees.

Participants in focus group discussions and interviews emphasized that forest dependent poor and vulnerable groups such as women within the studied CFUGs have suffered most from these changes (see also Uprety et al. 2011). Some female members of the Jamuna CFUG, for example, faced difficulty feeding their goats, which is a key source of livelihood, because of the grazing ban by the CFUG Executive Committee. Women are the most affected partly due to the existing local traditions and practices where women collect forest products for their households’ daily needs (e.g. grass and fodder for livestock, fuelwood for cooking). Another stakeholder group adversely affected are blacksmiths in the Binchaur CFUG (Charnawati Watershed) who use charcoal to make agricultural equipment. The restrictions on charcoal making has negatively affected their work and income.

**Viet Nam**

In Lam Ha District, interview participants reported that after the implementation of the government’s program of Payments for Forest Environmental Services (PFES)1 and the UN-REDD activities, they encountered increased restrictions on accessing and using forest resources. The local communities are only allowed to collect limited forest products such as dead or diseased trees and NTFPs such as bamboo shoots, mushrooms, and vegetables. Extracting timber and hunting are strictly banned. The restrictions were enforced through mobilizing forest patrolling units. There are over 10 groups of local people to patrol forest areas and prevent illegal forest encroachment, funded through the PFES. On one hand, many local community members have benefited greatly from the PFES program, as patrol members and/or through payment for forest management (Trung et al. 2015). On the other hand, however, some local community members expressed frustration with the restrictions, as they, for example, could not extract timber for house construction, which is compounded by the fact that they lack money to buy timber from other sources. It should be pointed out that it is hard to attribute the origin and enforcement of the restrictions as there are numerous initiatives in the sites emphasizing forest conservation. Nevertheless the community members are worried that future REDD+ mechanisms may further increase restrictions on their forest use rights.

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1 The PFES program aims to generate funds for forest conservation and improving livelihoods of forest owners and local people engaged in forest conservation. It was first piloted in Lam Dong and Son La province since 2008. Since 2011 PFES has been up-scaled to the national level. Till now, it has estimated to have collected about USD 142 million (Trung et al. 2015).
3.2 BENEFIT SHARING

Benefit sharing is among the most contentious issues in REDD+ and is one of the most important potential sources of impairment. Conflict in REDD+ may take place between government and communities, as well as between government offices at different administrative levels, and within communities due to different perceptions of fairness and justice, different expectations in the amount and modes of payment, as well as due to some people’s attempts to maximize their benefits while neglecting others’ rights. REDD+ stakeholders in the study sites asserted their aspirations regarding participation in benefit sharing decision making and for the amount of the ‘benefit’ itself. Powerful stakeholders, such as government and local elites, have stronger voices while those at grassroots level, such as local communities, have weaker claims. The existing concerns raised by the local communities regarding the possibility of capture and corruption by elites are rooted in experiences and existing distrust between local communities and the elites and government.

The study found that the high diversity of stakeholders and overlapping jurisdiction of government ministries and departments have slowed the development of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms, while diversity within the community in terms of socio-economic and political power also further complicates the issue of benefit distribution. Ideas of including socio-economic criteria in determining REDD+ payments can potentially enhance the equity in benefit sharing, but in some cases such as in Nepal, this can be a source of contention. The problem also often arises when there is a lack of valid and reliable data, or sometimes due to manipulations by the actors involved in order to increase the benefits they receive, which poses risks of social disharmony.

Cambodia

There is confusion among many stakeholders, particularly CSOs, on the status of the national REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism, this is despite the series of national and subnational level consultations with key stakeholders (e.g. government, NGOs, indigenous communities) that have been held. The interviews highlighted a few issues in this area including the complexity and transaction costs associated with involving all key stakeholders in the process of designing this benefit sharing mechanism. At the national government level alone, for example, this involved several ministries (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Ministry of Environment (MoE) and Ministry of Interior (MoI)), which are not easy to coordinate and ensure balance. This has, to some extent, slowed the process of developing benefit sharing mechanisms. Another challenge is deciding who should represent different and diverse stakeholder groups such as indigenous communities and NGOs in the process of developing the benefit sharing mechanisms.

The agreement between the FA and local communities in the SPF states that any carbon credits produced as a result of the protection of forest in the Permanent Forest Estate are the property of the Royal Government of Cambodia, while ownership of credits from other kinds of forested land (e.g. indigenous communal land titling) is currently being decided. Some villagers in Gati and O Chrar villages said that they are still unclear about what sort of benefit they will get and how the REDD+ benefits will be distributed among the community members, which became a key concern among the local stakeholders. Some villagers are pessimistic of getting any benefits from selling carbon credits based on the lack of benefits they have gained thus far. Discussion on issues regarding legal and policy framework on benefit sharing in Cambodia is provided in section 3.6 (legal and policy framework).

Myanmar

Myanmar is still in the first phase of the UN-REDD programme, and therefore is in early stages of developing its systems for REDD+, including benefit sharing arrangements. In the case study sites in Myanmar, there are different expectations of how REDD+ money should be distributed – the challenge is particularly clear with Myanmar developing its national benefit sharing mechanism. For example, in Hkamti District, some villagers proposed that the payment should be distributed equally to every household while others argued that those who contribute in the protection and conservation activities should get higher amounts of payment than those who are not participating in natural resource management. The villagers in this case are poor in general and mainly rely on shifting cultivation for their subsistence and livelihoods. They also said that they have limited experience in managing large amounts of money. Under current financial arrangements, for example when they get compensation from mining companies that operate in the area, they discuss and decide among themselves on how compensation will be managed. However, some villagers have concerns that the eldest leaders dominate the decision making due to patriarchal community social structures.

Nepal

Nepal established the Forest Carbon Trust Fund (FCTF) in 2009. It was designed as a performance based financial mechanism for local communities to get incentives for their efforts to protect forests in REDD+ pilot sites. The first payment was made to 104 CFUGs in the three watersheds (Kayarkhola, Charnawati and Ludhikola) in 2011. The establishment of the trust fund was considered as one of the key outcomes of the pilot project in addressing the challenging benefit sharing mechanism issue.
The CFUG representatives taking part in the research expressed satisfaction in their acknowledged role in forest protection through receiving REDD+ payments. However, they, along with NGO representatives, raised some concerns regarding the distribution of the money among and within CFUGs. It was found that while the list of poor households partly determines the amount of REDD+ payment to CFUGs (despite it supposedly being detailed in Community Forestry Guidelines), the CFUGs found identifying poor households to be a challenge; in other words they felt that they did not have sufficient knowledge on how to conduct the rankings, as well as unclear standards and categories in different CFUGs. Moreover, the methods and results were prone to manipulation by CFUG leaders (some CFUGs overestimated number of poor households to increase the funds they receive). These issues may create conflicts, especially when it affects the distribution of benefits.

Another challenge is in order to ensure that benefit sharing is equitable, the FCTF payment not only considers the carbon sequestered and conserved in the community forests, but also considers social criteria for the REDD+ payments (e.g. the number of indigenous people, number of poor and Dalit\(^2\) households as well as population of women). There were two major challenges associated with this. First, the CFUGs lack established arrangements to distribute the money to specific households. Though some of them have developed mechanisms to support poor households, they do not have any mechanism to provide targeted benefits to ethnic groups. Second, members of the Chhetri and Brahmin households (upper caste) objected to the money being distributed based on the ethnic or caste-based criteria. Members from the CFUGs in Dolakha argued that they can only provide targeted benefit to poor and Dalits but cannot provide based on specific ethnic or caste group (except for Dalits). There are concerns that this mechanism may exacerbate existing ethnic divisions and create conflict between different ethnic groups at the local level.

**Viet Nam**

The first phase of the UN-REDD programme focused on building REDD+ readiness. This included technical and capacity related issues, such as developing a benefit distribution system. A study commissioned by UN-REDD Program Phase 1 was undertaken in 2009 and 2010 to analyze the existing experiences on payment systems in Viet Nam and other countries, based on which a REDD+ compliant benefit distribution system for Viet Nam was proposed (MARD 2010). Despite shortcomings, including weak monitoring and marginalization of the poor, the pilot PFES program and national Five-Million Hectare Reforestation Program (SMHRP, also known as Program 661) have provided a base for the development of a benefit sharing system for REDD+ (MARD 2010, Pham et al. 2013).

In March 2015, the Lam Dong provincial People’s Committee issued a Provincial REDD+ Action Plan 2015 - 2020 (PRAP). This was the first provincial level REDD+ action plan anywhere in Southeast Asia. The PRAP provided detailed objectives and key activities of REDD+ implementation, for example, limited conversion of natural forest areas to other productive purposes and payment for forest environmental services (PFES) contracts targeting ethnic minorities. The PRAP understood the importance of equitable benefit sharing and participation as inequity in these matters can be potential sources of conflict. This understanding is reflected in the development and implementation of related policies and measures. The PRAP aims to evaluate and monitor REDD+ implementation, facilitating involvement of key stakeholders, strengthening capacity of local communities and enhancing overall commitment of key stakeholders in REDD+. The importance of its community forest allocation model and land use certificate granting system were also emphasized as one of the measures to implement PRAP. However, the recognition of customary and traditional regulations, as well as the role of women were largely omitted in the PRAP, despite the fact that 32 ethnic minorities are now living in the province, with varying degrees of reliance on the province’s forests.

Most of the local respondents shared their concerns about the possibility of elite capture of REDD+ benefits. The underlying reasons for the suspicion could relate to the government’s preference for fund-based approaches, in which PFES and REDD+ financial flows would be transferred or integrated into state budgets (Pham et al. 2013). Poor law enforcement, corruption and strongly centralized government might threaten the equity of benefit sharing systems and create distrust within local communities on how the finances will be managed and by whom. One local community member suspected unchecked relationship-based biases and corruption between PFES management bodies and elite people in his village. Local communities also worried about losing community solidarity (if there is any dispute on benefit sharing).

In one village in Lam Ha District, the forest management board assumes full authority to decide who can engage in the PFES scheme activities, such as patrolling. Some concerns were raised by the villagers regarding how the benefit (the payment from PFES) is distributed, and the implications this would have for the distribution of REDD+ benefits. The current distribution mechanism stipulates that an equal amount of money will be distributed to all households regardless of their actual work (e.g. in forest patrolling). While the amount of payment is based on group performance, in some cases, the elites or better off people in the village do not join the forest patrols placing increased burden on other group members (often indigenous people). The result being that for many members instead of patrolling three times per month, they have to go five times a month to meet the target. Some indigenous community members complained that the same payment is distributed among all households, regardless of input.

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\(^2\) Dalits are defined as historically and traditionally, socially discriminated caste group so called “lower caste” or “untouchable"
3.3 COMPETING DEMANDS

Differing and often competing stakeholder interests and management objectives regarding various forest resources were found to be an important source of conflict, with implications for implementation of REDD+. The increasing price of some commodities such as coffee, rubber and luxury grade timber put more pressure on forests and may lead to conflict with other forest management objectives (e.g. conservation). Moreover, in areas with especially valuable resources (e.g. minerals or land suitable for the planting of cash crops) the number of stakeholders and the extent of overlapping claims increase. Likewise, the changes in socio-economic conditions (e.g. migration, poverty, access to market) and technology (e.g. availability of chainsaws, motorbikes and mobile phones) at the local level also have changed the dynamics in the forest, particularly on how forest resources are exploited. The trade-offs and perceptions about the costs and benefits of illegal logging and extractive industry compared to potential REDD+ benefits creates complex and competitive dynamics which REDD+ implementers must take into account.

Cambodia

With its rich forest and land resources, the SPF and surrounding area are subject to various competing interests. For example, while the core protection forest zone may less likely be subject to economic land concession (ELC) designation, in some of the forest areas surrounding the SPF site ELC licenses have been granted to private companies. Overlapping boundaries between a private rubber plantation and a forest area managed by local community in Sre Khtum Village, for example, is subject to conflict over different claims of land tenure. The local communities blamed the lack of prior consultation before granting the concession as the main cause of the conflict.

Additionally, population growth, including through increased migration from other provinces, means new settlements are needed. Some members of a local indigenous community mentioned that the migration has caused issues when the new migrants clear forestland for their new settlement, or for land speculation for farmland for private businesses. This situation creates conflict over land occupation between some indigenous people and migrants.

Low intensity disputes also occurred between local communities over the use forest and unclear boundaries. The overlapping boundaries between the villages of Pu Char and O Chrar led to tensions when O Chrar villagers accused Pu Char villagers of over extracting forest products in an area O Chrar regularly uses. Furthermore, Pu Char villagers want to apply to get private land tenure status in the overlapping area. The current effort of the SPF and its REDD+ project is to address the issue of tenure insecurity through a land titling program that aims to secure and formalize land tenure for local indigenous communities in the SPF. Because of this, these overlapping and unclear boundaries need to be addressed to avoid further issues.

These aforementioned issues occurred in the backdrop of the existing issue of illegal logging which has been a frequent problem. According to Evans et al. (2013), some of the targeted species include luxury grade timber species (e.g. Afzeliaxylocarpa and Dalbergiabariensis) which are classified as endangered by the IUCN, and comprised more than 80 per cent of the total logs and cut trees that were seen or confiscated during patrols against illegal logging in the period between 2008 and 2010.

Additionally, Mahanty et al. (2015) highlighted the important role and possible influence of several players in the Seima area that have economic and political power such as tycoons with land and timber interests, ELC owners and the military. While these powerful actors are considered ‘indirect’ and ‘external’ to the forest carbon commodity chain, the behavior of these actors may exert significant influence over the implementation of the carbon schemes such as REDD+ and their ultimate outcomes. The recognition of this potential issue as well as preventive measures are important to prevent or mitigate potential conflict with REDD+ objectives.

Myanmar

Like Cambodia, Myanmar is also experiencing issues relating to the high value of land, and its resources (Buchanan et al. 2013), including the large areas of land granted as concessions. This is also found in Ayeyarwaddy, Bago and Sagaing regions, though not on the same scale as found in other regions such as Tanintharyi and Kachin (Woods 2015). For example, the main competing demands in the Bago site are found to be from the management of plantations, both privately and government owned. Additional significant competing demands included the activities of illegal loggers and the demand for a local bamboo chopstick factory. The issue of illegal logging is particularly prominent because of the accessibility of chainsaws and increased mobility of motorbikes to transport timber. During interviews, some villagers said that the profit these illegal loggers make easily offsets the perceived risk of getting arrested. As mentioned in earlier section, the needs of rural poor to extract forest resources for their subsistence are in conflict with government decisions which allocate a large tract of the forestland for jade mining in Hkamti Township.
Viet Nam

Lam Dong province is very rural based with roughly 70 per cent of the population engaged in agricultural, including forestry, activities, with a poverty rate of 20 per cent in rural areas (SNV 2014). In one of the case study sites, 67 per cent of the interviewed local households have very low income (less than US$90 per month) that mainly comes from coffee farming. The challenge of addressing poverty has been highlighted by the provincial and national governments. For example, the FPDP 2011-2020 emphasizes the developing the industrial sector, and reducing reliance on the agriculture and forestry sectors (SNV 2014).

While the livelihoods of the poor local ethnic minority groups depend on farming activities, many of them unfortunately have little land for cultivating food crops. Some of the respondents reported that in order to access more land for food cultivation, some of them have to enter the remaining forest area (production forest category). If there are no other options for rural livelihood development, the pressure to convert forestland for other purposes (e.g. crops cultivation) will be greater and may further degrade the forest. This also means that there exists a greater potential for forest and land conflicts regarding the objectives of keeping the forest standing and the needs of land for agriculture as a source of local livelihoods. Moreover, as the price of coffee in recent years remained high, more forest has been cleared for coffee plantations. Many members of the Bao Thuan commune felt that they have little option but to harvest forest products and for slash-and-burn farming to meet their subsistence needs.

A representative of Provincial Forest Protection office stated that other factors that may become a source of forest and forestland conflicts include the lack of respect for local people’s rights and needs, unfair and unclear benefit sharing mechanisms, population pressure and illegal logging. When these factors are emerging in the context of limited forest protection capacity, the increased demand will drive further forest destruction, leading to conflict.

3.4 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Resolving the existing conflict and being ready for potential contestation in the future over land and tenure are fundamental requirement for REDD+ to achieve its goal. The REDD+ readiness proposals and/or roadmaps in the countries covered have recognized the potential conflict from REDD+ activities and stipulate their plan or next steps for redressing grievances and conflict. However, the proposed grievance mechanisms are still in an early stage of development and are relatively general. Currently, Cambodia, Nepal and Viet Nam have conducted an assessment of the existing formal and informal grievance redress mechanisms at local and national levels and have proposed a plan to continuously improve the grievance mechanisms in the context of REDD+.

Some progress in the field has been observed. Nepal for example, has implemented REDD+ related grievance management through REDD+ Network, the role of which is agreed by all key stakeholders. Cambodia also put a special clause about conflict resolution mechanism in the written agreement between government agency and local community regarding the ‘Cooperative Implementation of the REDD+ Project’ in the SPF. Those mechanisms, however, are yet to be institutionalized and conflicts in the REDD+ sites are still being handled informally and on an ad-hoc basis. Ensuring the grievance redress and conflict resolution mechanisms that do exist, are clear and accessible is therefore critical.

REDD+ proponents and implementing partners should see REDD+ as an opportunity to strengthen their system and capacity for conflict transformation. In developing a REDD+ grievance redress mechanism, the REDD+ proponents do not have to start from scratch. Instead of creating new mechanisms, strengthening and reforming current mechanisms (judicial and extrajudicial) is the most apt solution to make the existing conflict transformation system competent enough to adapt to the specific context of REDD+.

Cambodia

The REDD+ proponents in the SPF area recognize REDD+ as a potential conflict issue and proposed a conflict management mechanism. Based on interviews with REDD+ pilot project stakeholders as well as the project documents (WCS 2013a), it is apparent that the REDD+ implementation team plans to use the existing conflict management mechanisms such as the commune councils (i.e. elected body for each of the communes in the country) and the local FA staff to address any conflict that may occur. The reason for using the existing conflict management mechanisms is that the familiarity of the local stakeholders with the existing system may increase the likelihood that all stakeholders will accept it and find it to be sustainable and cost-effective. Interviews with local stakeholders highlighted the question of adequacy considering that currently most conflicts in the SPF area are handled on an ad-hoc basis, rather than through formal and systematic mechanisms or by actors that have a conflict transformation orientation. A more clarified and detailed process is also needed as the current SPF REDD+ project document (WCS 2013a), particularly in terms of proposed mechanisms for addressing conflict, is still general and lacks detailed processes.

According to the written accord between the FA and local communities on the implementation of REDD+ in SPF, when it comes to addressing conflict (i.e. conflict resolution) it is stated that both parties agree to work together to promote
consensual agreements and collaborative implementation. In cases where agreement is not possible, the conflicts shall be solved amicably through mechanisms outside of the normal legal channels (i.e. extrajudicial) such as requesting a mutually agreed upon independent third-party to mediate and facilitate a consensus based solution based on the principle of respect for mutual benefits and other relevant regulations in force. In cases where there is no mutually satisfactory solution achieved, the dispute may be brought to the Council of Arbitration under the existing mechanism in the Kingdom of Cambodia.

The fact that the REDD+ implementer and local communities considered how to address conflict when it occurs should be acknowledged. However, a more comprehensive standard operational procedure on conflict management, effective coordination and implementation through ensuring the conflict management capacities are in place (among key REDD+ stakeholders) could strengthen the conflict management system. In this regard, there is a need for strengthening the current mechanisms through well-crafted capacity development programs on conflict transformation for the key stakeholders involved.

Myanmar

At the CF site in Phya Pon District, conflict management is typically handled by the CF Management Committee. If a conflict involves people from the same village, but not CFUG members, for instance due to logging and felling trees without prior consent, conflict is normally handled internally by the CFMC through traditional negotiation. However, if conflict arises between outsiders, people from other villages, CFMC members normally ask for help from village tract general administrative bodies. Compensation for the loss of trees is a typical solution for such conflicts. Involvement of police and court in terms of addressing conflict issues at CFs were not found in the study villages due to the distance to the police station and court and the high costs associated with travel. Moreover, no special resolution strategy, such as professional mediation, was observed in the area.

In the Taungoo District site the forest is owned by the government, and the community appeared reluctant to be involved in preventing and resolving conflict in the forest not only because of a lack of sense of recognition and ownership over the forest but also due to high risk to their safety or security. For example, some villagers mentioned that they sometimes see illegal logging and unsustainable exploitation of bamboo by outsiders which affects their sources of livelihood. The lack of recognition and ownership of the government teak plantation has stopped their interest and involvement to prevent illegal loggers in their village’s vicinity. According to villagers, the illegal loggers know this situation and take advantage. The villagers also said that they are concerned about their safety if they report illegal loggers. A villager said, “If I tell them [illegal loggers] not to cut the tree, they will cut my head.” Depending on the level of conflict, conflict resolution in the area is normally done by a group of village elders, village level general administration bodies or, if it cannot be addressed locally, the case will brought to township level general administration bodies.

Nepal

The key institution within CFUGs regarding conflict management is the Executive Committee (EC). When complaints and grievances are reported, the EC invites and meets the conflicting parties to seek resolution. If this is not possible, the EC may seek help from local Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFUN) or District Forest Office (DFO). Normally, when the conflict is between CFUGs, representatives from the affected CFUGs meet. If they cannot resolve the issue, they file the case with the DFO and follow formal legal procedures. The DFO attempts to resolve conflicts through consensus building and only in the worst cases, takes legal measures.

REDD+ pilot projects have seen the creation of two new institutions at the local level. First, a watershed level REDD+ Network comprised of representatives from participating CFUGs, in particular watersheds. Second, a district level REDD+ advisory committee comprising of DFO, FECOFUN and other stakeholders at the district level tasked with the responsibility of handling REDD+ related affairs, including conflict management.

The REDD+ Network has received grievances not only about REDD+, but also regarding the overall governance and management of community forests. A concern raised in the expert workshops and some FGDs was that the REDD+ Network was moving beyond its scope regarding conflict management, creating competition with FECOFUN, which itself could cause conflict.

Viet Nam

Officials at the provincial level expressed optimism that REDD+ will have positive impacts regarding conflict management, with one expectation being that the frequency of conflicts will decrease once REDD+ is implemented. In contrast, some of the interviewed local community members felt otherwise. The complexity of forest conflicts in Viet Nam and how they are managed is highlighted by Brockhaus and Di Gregorio (2014) and Pham et al. (2011). They feel that conflicts are under-reported and latent not because the conflict drivers are being effectively addressed but is instead a reflection of the lack of openness in the political system and lack of open dissent.
Current responsible institutions such as village and commune authorities, forest protection departments, and police forces all play limited roles in addressing conflict. Conversely, forest owners (e.g., Forest Management Boards (FMBs), state forest enterprises (SFEs), forest companies (FCs)) take on the responsibility of addressing conflict. There are reasons to doubt the fairness of such settlements due to conflicts of interest and power dynamics within given communities. In areas where there are large numbers of ethnic people, such as in the Bao Thuan and Gung Re communes of Di Linh District and in the Phu Son commune of Lam Ha District, customary rules play an important and effective role, alongside state norms, in conflict resolution. Aside from improving the current conflict settlement mechanisms, it is also suggested to work out new grievance mechanisms for REDD+ to ensure, for example, local people are able to pursue their rights and are able to file complaints when needed.

Rey et al. (2014) believe the existing legal framework in Viet Nam, including those for PFES, provides accessible and appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms relevant for natural resource management. They suggest, rather than creating additional mechanisms in the context of REDD+, Viet Nam should consider strengthening the capacity of existing institutions in charge of these mechanisms to ensure they can manage additional grievances or disputes resulting from REDD+. In contrast, Pham et al. (2013) highlights the numerous challenges to PFES grievance redress mechanisms as key stakeholders, specifically those providing the services, have limited access to the mechanisms. The reasons include the lack of understanding of their rights as well as challenges regarding the role of the village leader. Additionally, Annandale et al. (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2014) argue that although there is a legal basis to settle disputes and conflicts concerning forests and forestlands (e.g., Law on Land, Law of Forest Protection and Development, Law on Appeal and Complaint) the management of disputes and conflicts in the country, particularly with regard to natural resource management, remains unclear and hampered by the lack of openness in the political system. Therefore, Annandale et al. (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2014) believe it is necessary to learn from experiences, including those relating to PFES, strengthen procedures and techniques for conflict management and train conflict management specialists in the specific context of land and forest management and REDD+ in Viet Nam. This process should reflect and be implemented in conjunction with the preparation and implementation of REDD+ programs and relevant legal reform initiatives.

3.5 LEADERSHIP

Access to and control over forests and associated resources as well as financial and political capital have made leadership positions very attractive and is increased by the development of REDD+. This highly competitive environment means leaders are under increased pressure to perform their duties, however concerns of elite capture through implementation of REDD+ were present in all countries studied.

An additional source of consternation, in some sites, was the reduced role of traditional (i.e., indigenous) leaders due to stronger control by the government. While this was not directly linked to REDD+ it may impact its implementation on the ground. In Viet Nam, for example, this has been a source of dissatisfaction at the community level. Despite large efforts made in tenure reform, forest resources are still largely controlled by bureaucrats and elites. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that REDD+ provides opportunities to strengthen governance (including through the use of FPIC).

Cambodia

At the national level, the REDD+ taskforce is the leading agency implementing REDD+ in the country. However, engagement of multiple government agencies at different levels and different line ministries in the leadership body may impose a burden among decision makers within the REDD+ working groups, for example, resulting in a slow decision making process.

At the local level, most community leaders in the area are men. A number of villagers expressed the fact that this happens because there is a perception that men are more educated than women, are able to speak out in public and are more respected than women. Villagers also mentioned that leadership positions may be dangerous for women, especially when it requires going to the forests at night (i.e., forest patrol). Moreover, young community members are unlikely to be selected as leaders because there is a perception that they will not be respected by older persons and lack capacity and familiarity with the leadership positions. However, if highly educated, young members can be potentially selected as group or community leaders, but this rarely happens.

Myanmar

Myanmar is currently going through the process of transforming its political system. The challenges in this process of reform are found at both national and subnational levels. This was highlighted by the concern that decision making at the subnational level was often slow and bureaucratic and elite capture is prominent. Since the village leader is a paid position and the feeling was that income would increase through implementation of REDD+, many FGD participants expected the position of the village head would become more competitive and attractive to those with political ambitions.
Nepal

It is apparent that competition over leadership to secure access and control over financial and political capital has increasingly become a critical source of socio-political tension. For example, leadership at CFUG levels and in the district chapter of FECOFUN, is an important political space for competition over leadership (Upetre et al. 2011). The hierarchically structured network of FECOFUN from local to national levels provides a platform for leading the CF in a particular direction and mobilizing financial and other resources in their own interest. Because of the resources available in community forests and associated social power dynamics, the political parties have been asserting their claim through candidates in the CFUGs Executive Committee (the decision making body of the CFUG). This has made key leadership positions of resource rich CFUGs very lucrative. As a result, the political parties have been devising different methods to garner support from forest users. One FGD participant in Kayarkhola Watershed reported that he observed a new trend of candidates for CFUG leaders becoming more pro-active in getting votes from the CFUG members.

Viet Nam

In Lam Ha District site, there are two layers of leadership at the local level; formal leaders appointed by the government and traditional leaders of ethnic communities. In the past, traditional leaders had a bigger role in land and forest management (e.g. control the allocation of cultivation land, determining punishment for illegal activities and reconciling conflicts among village members). Nowadays, traditional leaders still exist and are recognized by the government as a cultural leader. While traditional leaders have reduced formal power in forest management (Hoang 2009), they still have strong influence on informal levels, including addressing grievances within the community (Nguyen et al. 2014).

These changes led to dissatisfaction among traditional leaders regarding their government-appointed counterparts. Traditional leaders also question the capacity of the government to preserve forests. In some interviews, they repeated that, “the government [specifically forest rangers] failed to preserve and manage forests in comparison with what villagers did before and that forests were now increasingly degraded”. Nevertheless, the traditional leaders expressed that the ethnic community hopes that the UN-REDD program will bring new opportunities and a bigger role for community members to preserve the remaining forest areas.

3.6 LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS

Often ambiguous provisions in legal documents including those related to REDD+, overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies, and insufficient consultation with affected communities are the main sources of impairment relating to legal and policy frameworks. Each of these is a critical issue in many ways. Weak coordination across line ministries during policy formulation and resulting ambiguous provisions in the policies might not only incite conflict between the concerned ministries but may also negatively affect communities at the grassroots level. Furthermore, insufficient consultation with affected communities during policy formulation, sidelines traditional and customary practices. One outcome from this is that local communities have little awareness of the laws that affect them, which may lead to confrontation with government authorities when they fail to follow these laws.

There are ongoing tensions because state and conservation organizations emphasize conservation of forest resources while curtailing the rights of local communities. However, there is progress, for example, the Provincial REDD+ Action Plan (PRAP) in Lam Dong province, Viet Nam recognizes the importance of the active participation of key stakeholders and the capacity development of local communities as a solution to many of these problems. Because PRAP is integrated into the Province’s Forest Protection and Development Plan effective participation is being mainstreamed in policies and actions beyond REDD+.

Cambodia

There are two particularly important issues regarding national legal and policy framework of REDD+ in Cambodia namely ‘carbon rights’ and ‘benefit sharing’. There is still no explicit definition or provision in the law regarding the carbon rights from REDD+ because, as some researchers (Yeang et al. 2014, Chapman 2015) note, in the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (Article 58) ‘state property’ is defined to include almost all of the country’s resources, including natural resources (and forests). In other words, if carbon from REDD+ is categorized as, for example, a natural resource, the ownership and use rights of the carbon will go to the state. However, if the forest is privately owned the ownership then belongs to the landholders. In community forestry arrangements where a community holds communal forest use rights or indigenous land titles, the community retains the right to use the forest but ownership of the carbon is still held by the state (Yeang et al. 2014). In this regard, Chapman et al. (2015) argue that the current Cambodian legal framework has not provided a strong legal basis for local communities to claim their rights to carbon and the monetary benefits attached to it.

As there is still uncertainty on the REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism in Cambodia, it is important for REDD+ decision makers, planners and other key stakeholders to comprehensively discuss and clarify the legal aspects of carbon rights and the distribution of revenues from selling carbon in the benefit sharing mechanisms, especially in terms of local communities.
In particular, it is important that REDD+ ensures appropriate benefits are allocated local communities since it will likely affect community acceptance, create incentives for participation in REDD+ implementation and reduce the likelihood of conflict. It is also important to ensure the national legal framework of REDD+ is not conflicting with the customary use of forest resources because it may impact the effective implementation of REDD+ on the ground.

**Myanmar**

Some laws in Myanmar relating to forest and land management are considered ambiguous and contradictory. For example, access and use rights for local people are granted according to Forest Law (FD 1992) Article 17 as long as land is used for non-commercial purposes (commercial usage is allowed with permission). However, Forest Law Article 40 states that forest users are not allowed to trespass or encroach in a reserved forest and Article 42 states that no one is allowed to fell, cut, girdle, mark, lop, tap or injure to any trees in a reserved forest. In other words, how local people are supposed to legally use forests resources in reserved areas is unclear when considering both Articles 17, 40, and 42 of the Forest Law.

This is exemplified by the overlap between the Forest Law (1992), Protection of Wildlife and Protected Area Law (1994) and other laws related to Mining (e.g. Myanmar Mine Law 1994) and agriculture (e.g. Farmland Law 2012). For example, the Ministry of Mines (MOM) can notify or designate land as ‘gem land’ in accordance with its own law (Myanmar Mines Law 1994). The Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MOECAF) has its mandate to expand forested land as reserved forest, protected forests, public forests and nature reserves based on approval of the Cabinet. Through this MOECAF designated the extension of Hukaung Valley Tiger Reserve so it overlapped with the gem land of the MOM, in other words the land was open for precious stone mining. The situation is further exacerbated by weak coordination among the line ministries, especially in policy development. The overlapping responsibility among the governing bodies on natural resource management can create tension or disputes between line departments and their staff.

Moreover, people living near and around forests have a limited understanding and awareness of the existing laws and regulations affecting their livelihoods (Gritten et al. 2014, 2015). Policy formation occurs with limited consultation with affected local communities, reflecting on the reluctance of powerful decision makers to cede control and often creating conflict between local communities and government staff. This situation is further exacerbated by the development and implementation of REDD+, for example, by the creation of new laws that further conflict with existing ones.

**Nepal**

In Nepal, a number of forest-related policy making processes are ongoing, such as the REDD+ Strategy and the Forest Sector Strategy. These policies tend to prioritize and focus on conservation over local utilization (e.g. Bampton and Cammaert 2007, Gritten et al. 2014, 2015). This has created tension between organizations advocating for community rights, the government and conservation organizations. In 2012, when the government-proposed the amendment of the 1993 Forest Act, a core component of CF, it was strongly opposed by CFUGs on the basis that it would curtail local autonomy and rights. This raised suspicions by some CFUGs and CSOs that the government initiated the amendment based on the perceived potential increase in the value of forests as a result of REDD+.

**Viet Nam**

In addition to the omission of customary and traditional regulations and the role of women in the PRAP, another legal issue constraining the participation of local people in REDD+ processes is that communities and villages are not considered legal entities. According to Article 84, Civil Code 2005, an organization shall be recognized as a legal entity when:

1. It is established lawfully;
2. Has a well-organized structure;
3. Possesses property independent from that of individuals and other organizations, and bears its own liability with such property; and
4. Independently enters into legal relations under its own name.

Circular 04/2012/TT-BNV defines villages not as state administrative bodies, but as self-managed organizations of a community who lives in the same area as a commune. This means that a village itself does not own any property and cannot be involved in any contracts or civil relations. In the case study village in Lam Ha District, the UN-REDD program set up a village development fund to provide loans for local livelihood development. It was expected that the fund will be transferred directly from the provincial UN-REDD budget to households of the village. However, the issue of how and who could legally receive and distribute the budget to households arose. Because the village, or the village leaders, were not recognized as legal entities, they could neither open a bank account to receive the budget, nor receive an official stamp for administrative documents. This situation led to the decision to involve the office of commune People’s Committee (PC) as an intermediate agent for all transactions and distribution of the fund. Eventually, the vice-chairman of the commune PC will bear the responsibility of a manager of the fund. The feeling was that this created a disconnect between the potential beneficiaries and the fund, with concern of the process being overly bureaucratic.
3.7 PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION

Full and meaningful participation and information sharing were found to be amongst the most important and interlinked issues for successful REDD+ implementation. This view is mirrored in various REDD+ documents and in the investment in facilitating effective participation in REDD+ development and implementation. In other words, people are more likely to participate in REDD+ if they receive accessible and accurate information throughout the process. Some initiatives that strive for effective participation and information sharing, such as FPIC, were appreciated in many of the sites, however, challenges such as time and capacity are required to conduct participation and information sharing effectively.

One of the main problems voiced in the field work was the feeling that state actors are disproportionately powerful which undermines the equitable participation of concerned local communities and indigenous people. The lack of legally recognized local representative organizations in many of the project sites also posed challenges for the proper implementation of these initiatives, including effective communication. While FPIC has been conducted, many community members are still not aware, or misunderstand, what exactly REDD+ entails. Likewise, limited information sharing, such as regarding the potential benefits of REDD+, has raised initial expectation of benefits, especially financial, and has resulted in confusion and frustration over time. Despite these issues, participation and information sharing in certain sites was viewed by many stakeholders in a positive light and was facilitated by REDD+ development and implementation. Yet, the voluntary participation of very poor people, whose daily subsistence requirements are more pressing than long term planning processes, is still an issue.

Cambodia

The implementation of FPIC in SPF was an important contribution for REDD+ because it is the first instance of full FPIC in Cambodia (WCS 2013b). The FPIC process engaged the residents of all 20 villages in SPF through a lengthy process of awareness-raising, participation, consultation and consent seeking for REDD+. A three phase process was devised and implemented to ensure compliance with international standards (Table 3):

Table 3: REDD+ awareness raising and FPIC in the SPF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I: Awareness raising on Climate Change and REDD+</th>
<th>Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Cambodian Rural Development Team (CRDT) conducted focus group discussions and mini workshops with forest communities on various climate change and REDD+ related topics including:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Causes of climate change;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Greenhouse gas emission reductions;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The role of forests in reducing emissions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Generating REDD+ carbon credits; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Livelihood development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase II: REDD+ and Community Engagement</th>
<th>WCS and CRDT facilitated:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Multi-stakeholder focus group discussions (FGD) on REDD+ rights, roles, responsibilities, and possible benefits;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community-level FGDs on REDD+ design and concerns;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Workshops to raise community awareness of national community forestry law and relevance to REDD+ pilot project agreement;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• FPIC FGDs to determine consent to the REDD+ pilot project; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of legally binding agreements between communities and the Forestry Administration (FA).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase III: Processing FPIC Results</th>
<th>WCS and CRDT are continuing FPIC processes including:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reviewing REDD+ pilot project implementation agreement;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Collecting further consent of community members for involvement in the REDD+ pilot project; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Signing of the agreements through family-level consent forms and community-level agreements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Anderson 2011)
The FPIC facilitation team faced problems related to the lack of strong legally-recognized local representative organizations which could sign legal agreements on behalf of villagers. Where possible, the Indigenous Community Commissions (ICCs), formed as part of the communal land titling process set forth in the 2001 Land Law, were engaged to sign agreements on behalf of villagers. However, these types of organizations did not exist in every village so in some cases the FPIC process needed to operate through local government structures, engaging the village chiefs instead. This was somewhat problematic because village chiefs are not democratically elected like the chiefs of the ICCs (referred to as meysahakoum). It is less likely that ICCs will exist in other REDD+ project sites, so the problem of civil society community representation will remain a challenge for FPIC in Cambodia.

Myanmar

In one of the villages studied in Naga area, problems with access to information were found. This village had been involved in contested land management regarding mining operations stemming from poor information sharing by the MOM regarding gem mining in the area. In 2001, the MOM designated a large tract of land in the area for the purpose of prospecting gems. This led to conflict over land for shifting cultivation by the indigenous people and land allotted to the mining company. In addition to poor consultation with affected villagers, the lack of accessible information on the issue presented challenges. One villager said that if the government allotted land in this way, the villagers would need to find another area for cultivation which would compete with the wildlife areas such as the Hugaung Valley Tiger Reserve.

According to the FGDs with the local community, poor participation of local communities in REDD+ projects also stems from the lack of information dissemination to the villagers. According to the villagers, no FPIC activities or public awareness campaign have been conducted. As a result, the villagers thought the REDD+ project was a forest plantation project. This was also because in the past, commercial teak plantations were established and villagers were hired as labor. When the REDD+ pilot project site selection was made, no villagers were informed, involved or consulted in the selection process. Additionally, in some cases, participation of local communities is linked with the compensation for work time lost through attendance. This is particularly important because, according to the FGD participants, there is less participation in events that provide no financial incentives.

Nepal

The REDD+ pilot projects in Nepal have promoted inclusivity in REDD+ activities and leadership positions. This has contributed to developing leadership capacity of individuals from marginalized groups. For example, of Birenchok CFUG’s 200 households, 25 are Dalits, five of which received NRs 10,000 (roughly USD 100) each from the REDD+ payments, which they invested in rearing cattle. This has motivated them to participate in forest management activities, and is mirrored in the increased representation of Dalit and women in the EC of the CFUG. However, not all the increased participation is self-motivated. Some representatives from the CFUGs felt that community leaders have pressured marginalized groups to participate in order to meet the project requirements. An additional issue is the backlash by more affluent groups within the CFUGs against the positive discrimination.

During the FGDs, community members in various CFUGs expressed that community leaders sometimes had not provided clear information on REDD+, thereby creating a sense of mistrust. The FGDs conducted in 2011 revealed that the community leaders had high expectations regarding REDD+, anticipating large cash income with little transaction costs. However, the FGDs and interviews in 2012 revealed a clear sense of confusion and frustration, even among the leaders, after the first REDD+ payments were less than expected. However, in Ludhikhola Watershed, CFUGs members taking part in the FGDs showed a reasonable level of awareness on the criteria and the actual amount of money they received. As a result, there was no major issue related to payment in these CFUGs.

Viet Nam

Challenges were identified in an evaluation and verification of the FPIC process under the UN-REDD program in Lam Dong province found some problematic issues (Nguyen et al. 2010, Pham et al. 2015):

- Information related to the risks and costs associated with the program were not shared with local people;
- The FPIC timeframe was too short (2 hours) for discussion within the village; and
- There was no mechanism, independent of the FPIC team, to review any complaint made by local people during the FPIC process.

Additionally in theory the FPIC process piloted under the UN-REDD Vietnam Program involved nine steps:

1. Preparation;
2. Consultation with local officials;
3. Recruitment of local facilitators;
4. Training of local facilitators;
5. Awareness raising;
6. Village meeting;
7. Recording the decision;
8. Reporting to UN-REDD Vietnam; and
9. Verification and evaluation.

In practice, however, according to Nguyen et al. (2010), Nguyen et al. 2012, and Pham et al. (2015), steps five and six were combined.

These challenges were also identified in our fieldwork, finding insufficient information was provided to the villagers, especially in regard to costs and risks of the project (e.g. social risks, inequitable benefit distribution, corruption and tenure issues). Awareness raising programs seemed to focus only on potential benefits, particularly money, rather than potential impacts, such as transaction costs.

These problems reflect the fact that FPIC is not mentioned in the National REDD+ program. The lack of FPIC in the legal framework weakens it somewhat and leaves it open to interpretation. These issues are compounded by lack of capacity of those conducting it (Pham et al. 2015). The stakeholder perceptions of the FPIC process in Lam Dong site were that it was conducted to meet the requirements of the donor, rather than respecting the rights of the local community (Pham et al. 2015).

It is widely understood that ethnic minorities have significant knowledge, experience and skills from years of cultivating the land, including forests. There is, however, a strong concern that ethnic minorities are being marginalized through ineffective participatory processes.

The dominant power of state actors, such as the forest management board in Lam Ha District, gives little space for community participation because information sharing is limited and one directional. For example, contracted households under the PFES scheme, especially ethnic minorities, showed a limited understanding of where the payments come from, how the payments are calculated and what their contractual obligations and rights are. Only one respondent, an ethnic majority leader of a patrol unit and UN-REDD program local facilitator, could explain and distinguish between PFES and REDD+ and assessed that the current payment was not fair as payments to providers (i.e. villagers) did not reflect the benefits that the environmental service users, specifically local hydropower plants, received. Three respondents, who are from ethnic minorities and leaders of patrol units, knew the exact location of the forest plots involved in the PFES scheme. The other respondents, also ethnic minorities, had little awareness of the specific forest plots they are responsible to protect. They reported that when signing contracts, the management board failed to point out the allocated forest plots on maps. This issue is compounded by the fact that none of the contracted households had a copy of the PFES contracts.

3.8 QUALITY OF RESOURCES

The performance-based payment mechanism of REDD+, with the amount of payment being affected by the extent and quality of forest resources (i.e. the performance), makes the declining quality of forest resources a source of contention. There are associated data issues which include the accuracy of different forest quantity and quality measurements. Moreover, most often, governments prioritize stakeholders such as private sector companies for managing productive and high quality forest resources while communities, in most instances, are given only poor quality forests. The pursuit of REDD+ benefits may lead to further elite bias in the allocation of forest resources.

Cambodia

In Cambodia, deforestation is a big issue; roughly 1.2 per cent a year for the period 1990-2015 (FAO 2015). Forest clearance in the REDD+ project site has been undertaken mostly by smallholders (farming areas of a few hectares), some medium scale farmers (areas of a few tens of hectares) or by speculators selling to larger farmers. Some forest is cleared for traditional subsistence crops (rice, maize, etc.), but most is cleared for cash crops such as cashew, soy and cassava. Non-forested lowland grasslands/wetlands are being converted to rice paddy. This is not represented in the deforestation rate, but the relative biodiversity impact may be higher. The upland grasslands are rapidly being converted to tree crops and cassava, but their biodiversity importance, at least for threatened vertebrates, is believed to be much lower (Evans et al. 2013, WCS 2013a). The REDD+ project document has also identified the increasing number of issued Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) in the area. While these ELCs are not in the REDD+ project site, the ELCs have been identified as the other main cause of deforestation in the region, increasing pressure on forests throughout the area (WCS 2013a).
Nepal

In the study sites, CF users and key informants assessed forest quality to be improving, perhaps due in part to a vested interest in receiving REDD+ benefits. The improvement was substantiated by carbon monitoring which saw carbon stocks in the forests of the three watersheds increase by 0.4%–2.5% (Patel et al. 2013).

A key member of Ludikhola’s REDD+ Network reported a decline in reports of illegal logging—a major issue at the time of the state handover of forests to communities. Despite improvements in forest quality, there have been tensions regarding forest size. ICIMOD’s GPS measurements of the CF areas have differed with the manual measurements recorded in the Operational Plans (OPs) by District Forest Office (DFO). In one instance, the CF area increased by 61 ha according to the new measurements (using GPS); in another, it decreased by 52.25 ha. Such discrepancies have been contentious because CF area is directly proportional to potential REDD+ benefits.

Viet Nam

Even though the Government of Viet Nam has attempted to improve local people’s forest rights through Forestland Allocation (FLA) since the early 1990s, forest management in Viet Nam in general still represents a continuing dominant role of the state organizations over the interest of local and forest-dependent communities. Most of the high quality forest areas, for example, are controlled by Forest Management Boards, State Forest Enterprises and forest companies. Local communities and households are often allocated bare land or poor forest areas (e.g. Sikor et al. 2013). If this management pattern remains unchanged, benefits from REDD+ will go to the Forest Management Boards, State Forest Enterprises and forest companies. Despite uneven government efforts to protect forests, forest loss and degradation continue to be a problem. In the surveyed area, the majority of interviewees said that forest loss still occurs in their locality due to logging and agricultural land expansion. Other causes are mismanagement and shifting cultivation.

One way to determine forest quality is to capture how local people perceive changes of their forest resources. In Lam Ha District, respondents who often harvest mushrooms and bamboo in the forest said that these resources have decreased. For example, 10 years ago Ms. H (Ma ethnic majority) could harvest 15-20 kg of mushroom per day during the high season (July to September). Now she has to spend more time collecting a smaller amount (7-10 kg). All respondents believed that the surrounding forest was depleted compared to 10 years ago, in terms of quantity of NTFPs (mushroom, bamboo, orchid, rattan, honey, vegetables), wildlife, and timber. Respondents perceived that the decrease in forest quality was due to illegal logging, outsider NTFP collectors, changes in weather patterns as well as coffee plantation expansion.

3.9 TENURE SECURITY

As with many sources of impairment, tenure security is strongly linked to policy and legal frameworks and competing demands for forest resources. Contested tenure and claims over forests and land have been identified in most of the case study sites, with local communities still experiencing weak tenure security. Either due to government policy to maximize its revenue by leasing out high value forests to concessionaires or because of issues relating to rent seeking, the productive forest is beyond the reach of community in most of the cases. Similarly, local communities are often victims of overlapping ministry responsibilities and ambiguous government policies. Nonetheless, there has been an effort in REDD+ projects to use implementation of REDD+ as an opportunity to clarify land tenure, though with numerous challenges. Likewise, such efforts can be successful in formalizing land tenure, however, they are diluted by conflicts which could be due to undefined boundaries, conditional or short-term tenure and lack of recognition for customary institutions.

Cambodia

In Cambodia, most of the forests are owned and managed by the state, with CF making up only 1.8 per cent (183,725 ha) of forestland as of 2013. As a comparison Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) are estimated at 1.3 million ha (RECOFTC 2014b).

One of the highlights of the REDD+ project in SPF are efforts to support indigenous communities to secure community land rights by obtaining Indigenous Communal Land Titles. Securing and formalizing land tenure for communities is central to the project. Andoung Kraoleng village, for example, received its land title in March 2012, which was only the third village in the country to reach this stage. However, there are still indirect threats to local tenure including undefined borders and also weak traditional structural institutions and lack of voice (Evans et al. 2013). Additionally farmland is being lost through land appropriation with a future risk of seizure by large land concessions or mines (Evans et al. 2013).

Our study found that indigenous communities are still concerned about the possible allocation of their land for ELCs, with companies seeing it as a possible area for rubber plantations. This problem is caused by unclear guidelines in granting ELCs and policies over forestland use due to lack of transparency and general poor governance. An attempt by companies to expand forestland borders and overlapping boundaries between ELCs and community forestland in Sre Khtum village caused conflict. The Seima Forestry Administration officials worked hard to lobby the government not to convert the SPF area to ELCs.
Baird (2014) noted that although the land titling project has been somewhat successful in ensuring local access to agricultural land resources crucial to livelihoods, neither trees nor forested land can be included within communal land titles in Cambodia, only agricultural land. The main forests where people generate income from tapping wood resin have not been registered as communal land. Instead, they are defined as “state lands,” which means the forests remain under the control of the Forest Administration and is a protected forest area. This excludes locals from management decisions, even if they still have access to the resin trees, for now. Thus, Baird (2014) argues that this project cannot be seen as exemplary in ensuring access to resources crucial to local livelihoods, despite supporting groundbreaking communal agricultural land tenure. While the REDD+ project has helped increase tenure security over local agricultural lands and future agricultural lands, it has also supported a state-led process that may weaken local control over most forest areas.

Myanmar

In Myanmar, forests are primarily owned by the State, with CF, as of 2013, making up only 0.13 per cent of the forestland (RECOFTC 2014b). This is despite strong commitments by the government to develop CF in the country.

In the Naga region local communities have been disadvantaged by two contested and overlapping policies between MOECAF and MOM. As previously mentioned, in 2001 MOM designated a large tract of land for the purpose of prospecting gems. In 2010, MOECAF recognized the importance of biodiversity conservation and expansion of the Hugaung Tiger Reserve Valley within the study area and it has publicly announced the boundary of the area for wildlife conservation. The designation of land for the two purposes (conservation vs. commercial extraction) which was conducted without consultation has caused the loss of communities’ fallow land (for their traditional shifting cultivation), and the communities consequently had to find new lands in the protected area or reserved forest area to address this loss. Local communities also believe the government has been trying to eliminate shifting cultivation for many years, ignoring their customary rights. These experiences and perceptions may complicate future REDD+ implementation.

Nepal

The share of forestland in Nepal under community possession is 31 per cent, up from 19 per cent in 2002 (RECOFTC 2013). Despite the progress made there are still national, as well as site specific challenges. In principle the demarcation of CF boundaries considers traditional uses of forest land and resources, but the study found that in practice this is not always the case. Kayarkhola’s Chepang population in particular felt that the government had not adequately addressed its customary rights and livelihood needs. The Chepang claim customary use rights in neighboring areas outside their designated leasehold forests, insisting that the government has not provided adequate compensation. The result is ongoing tensions between Chepang and other groups in the watershed.

Viet Nam

In Viet Nam over 25 per cent of forestland are defined as community forests (RECOFTC 2014b). However, often the poor quality forests and land in the possession of local people is a problem. In such context, local communities are worried that benefits from REDD+ will likely go to state organizations, this also reflects the power of state forest enterprises, for example, in the ownership of land (Pham et al. 2012, Sikor and To 2014). Local ethnic communities also mentioned that the settlement of conflicts related to ethnic minorities leads to further problems because policies and laws do not take into account characteristics of their ownership relations, traditional norms and rules, and farming systems.

Compared with private ownership in which forest management is practiced by individual households with 50 year land-use certificates;3 the PFES forest contracting between the forest management board and households did not contribute to securing tenure rights in Lam Ha District. Contracts are renewed annually based on household performance determined by the forest owner. Rights and responsibilities of households are limited in the contract. If tenure rights of community forestry remain unsecured while PFES is embedded with REDD+, potential disputes could occur.

In the study site in Lam Ha District, there is a different perception of forest tenure rights between local communities and authorities. While local communities are not allowed to cut trees, in 2012, the provincial government conducted harvesting and clearing in 1,000 hectares of forest surrounding the researched village without any prior consultation or notification to local communities. There was a feeling of double standards, with one set of rules for the government and the other for local people.

3 For more information see Nguyen (2005)
4. LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAYS FORWARD

4.1 Overview of findings

Section 3 presented some possible sources of impairment that may exacerbate existing, and create new conflicts regarding the development and implementation of REDD+ in the sites in the four countries. Understanding the sources of impairment in forest management not only helps to flag issues that require greater attention in REDD+ planning, but also provides crucial information for addressing the conflicts in a sustainable manner, in other words, conflict transformation. The more key stakeholders know and understand about conflict situations (e.g. triggers), the more effectively they can transform the conflict (e.g. Engel and Korf 2005, Gritten et al. 2009, Dhiaulhaq et al. 2015).

The findings from the case studies show that the nine sources of impairment outlined in the research framework are present in various forms in the sites studied. The results of this study show in some cases the REDD+ sites have suffered from existing conflicts prior to REDD+ while in some cases the implementation of REDD+ has also introduced new conflicts (e.g. in the sites in Viet Nam there are existing tensions relating to the interests of the different ethnic groups present (see Pham et al. 2012, Sikor and To 2014)). The conflicts at the study sites stemmed from various sources of impairment, with some being more prominent than others. The prominence of the sources of impairment also has implications not only for the impacts of the conflict, but also the significance of the interventions to address them (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Significance of conflict sources regarding conflict transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSALITY LEVEL</th>
<th>SOURCES OF CONFLICTS</th>
<th>INTERVENTION IMPACTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Legal and policy framework</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenure security</td>
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<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Participation and Information</td>
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While Figure 2 is an illustration of the general findings of the research presented here, it enables the identification of focus areas when aiming for transformative outcomes when addressing the conflicts (i.e. intervention impacts) through focusing on structural causes such as legal and policy framework and tenure security. Generally speaking one can view the legal and policy framework as well as their implementation as being the key issue for transformation, playing a significant role in determining the possible sources of impairment. This followed by ensuring tenure security and participation. However, addressing the legal and policy framework, tenure security and participation in REDD+ requires significant investment, including time and political will from the decision makers and project implementers, while addressing issues such as conflict management in theory requires less investment through, for example, awareness raising and trainings. However, addressing conflict management capacity (proximate / intermediate cause) will have less transformative impacts without also addressing the higher level legal and policy framework, tenure security and participation and information (i.e. the structural causes). The emphasis on these sources of impairment is also emphasized in the literature on the issue (e.g. Ribot and Larson 2012, Dhiaulhaq et al. 2015). The intermediate and proximate conflict causes are bunched together as they were found to have mixed levels of importance in the cases studied.

In terms of conflict intensity, it is clear that the current conflicts in the case study sites are still at the low level, indicated by the occurrence of anxiety, debates and critiques. Moreover, there is no physical exchange or violence found in the study sites. However, this does not mean that the conflict issues are insignificant, it may be that the conflicts will intensify (Engel and Korf 2005, Yasmi et al. 2006). Identifying sources of impairment preemptively helps create a deeper understanding with the goal of mitigating conflict before it emerges. If a conflict is left smoldering and/or improperly addressed, it is possible it will intensify and may cause damaging consequences (Wall and Callister 1995).

This study also found significant progress made by REDD+ in terms of mitigating and transforming conflict. Some new developments such as increased participation of traditionally marginalized groups, including the use of FPIC (in Cambodia, Nepal and Viet Nam) may help address existing or potential conflicts. Similarly, the inclusion of traditionally disadvantaged social groups (e.g. Dalits) in the REDD+ payment criteria in Nepal, for example, has sought to address the issues of social injustice. Additionally, the current development of grievance redress mechanisms (although still in their early stages of development) in the four countries studied could positively contribute to reducing conflicts in and around forestlands in the REDD+ sites, though admittedly, weaknesses in these processes reflect its gradual and continuing evolution. These findings reflect that there is still a gap between the theory, and arguably the idealism, of FPIC and the realities determined by national and subnational contexts (e.g. national and subnational government interests, as well as the political system [see Pham et al. 2015]).

The recognition and appreciation of communities for the REDD+ projects are attributable to the efforts and good faith in implementing FPIC in the REDD+ sites. Some of the FPIC processes in the case study sites were some of the first ever applied in the country (e.g. Viet Nam), with the levels of participation being almost unheard of. The research in Viet Nam found for example that the local people involved in the FPIC process said that it was the first time they were involved in any consultation process regarding forest management. These are big steps taken by the government and other REDD+ proponents towards effective participation in REDD+, there is however still a great deal of room for improvement. Some indigenous people’s organizations (e.g. AIPP and IWGIA 2012) suggested that to improve FPIC processes in REDD+, emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring there is sufficient time and opportunities for communities to reach a consensus decision. FPIC should also be understood as a continuous process rather than a single event, in other words, it should not be reduced to voting to obtain the consent decision, but rather a continuous, transparent and equitable process of negotiation and consultation among communities.

Additional challenges regarding the capacity of various stakeholders about the use of FPIC include the fact that there are different interpretations of the steps required, as highlighted in the findings. This is partly because of different interpretations by international organizations such as the World Bank (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) and the UN (UN-REDD). These differences are reflected on the ground. Moreover, Mahanty et al. (2015) raise a concern that local people’s ‘consent’ may be because of the cultural protocols or trust in a long-time NGO partner, rather than meaningful understanding of the intervention or engagement from a position of empowerment. Mahanty et al. also highlighted that the power asymmetries between local villagers and project actors may be hard to address in a short period of time. This, combined with the overall complexity of explaining the timeframes and transactions of REDD+, can influence FPIC outcomes, even where project facilitators intend to meaningfully engage communities.

The study also found that REDD+ implementation affects different forest stakeholders differently. The examples provided in the earlier section show that women and rural poor suffered the most when there are restrictions regarding access and use of forest resources due to conservation policies and REDD+. This is also because they have a lack of alternatives available for their livelihoods. In this regard, equity and gender consideration in REDD+ is particularly important, especially in countries where women and rural poor are highly dependent on forest resources. Furthermore, in many areas access, use and control of forest resources are influenced by deeply gendered power relations (Khadka et al. 2014). In this regard, this paper would suggest the importance of ensuring equity in benefit sharing mechanisms to ensure that forest dependent and marginalized poor as well as women’s and men’s contributions to REDD+ activities are proportionately rewarded. Moreover, it is also important to highlight the importance of access for women in REDD+ decision making and capacity building programs, to ensure that women have a voice in REDD+ decision making (Setyowati 2012).
Regarding the impacts of restrictions on access and use of forest resources imposed by REDD+, it is apparent that these impacts were not effectively addressed by only providing a short-term remedy such as compensation for the losses. Rather, REDD+, in conjunction with other forest management and governance initiatives should strive to provide a more long-term strategy of, for example, enhancing and diversifying local livelihood options as well as improving tenure, which has been exemplified in some REDD+ projects (e.g. SPF Cambodia). Financial and non-financial incentives for local communities’ involvement in the REDD+ projects may also provide additional income and improve local acceptance of the REDD+ activities.

Ensuring the effective implementation of social and environmental safeguards into REDD+ strategies and implementation is also essential for the effectiveness of REDD+ on the ground, particularly to ensure that REDD+ projects ‘do no harm’ to local communities and the environment (Peskett and Todd 2013). There are concerns that they do not go far enough, being open to interpretation by governments and REDD+ project proponents and relying on the resources and capacities of NGOs as watchdogs (REDD Monitor 2015). Additionally, there are also concerns that the ‘do no harm’ principle implies that forest communities, including indigenous peoples, already have secure rights. In other words that the safeguards, and other aspects of REDD+ should strive to move beyond the do no harm to also secure rights (Marion Suiseeya 2015), in other words, being transformative.

In order to mitigate the negative impacts of conflicts, the aforementioned direct and underlying causes of forest and land conflict have to be meaningfully addressed. If existing development challenges such as unclear benefit sharing mechanisms, elite capture and lack of accountability are not addressed within REDD+, the influx of funds could create perverse incentives and deepen economic and social inequity. As previously discussed, equity and social well-being play central roles in ensuring successful governance of natural resources. Potential misappropriation of REDD+ funds and the implications for local communities would have adverse impacts on forests, which in turn would seriously compromise efforts to mitigate climate change (Doherty and Schroeder 2011). In regards to addressing corruption issues in REDD+, Dermawan et al. (2011) suggested that special consideration should be given to the introduction of systems for independent financial monitoring and oversight as well as to significant investment in building financial management capacity and strengthening national government ownership.

The findings have several implications for achieving conflict transformation in the study sites and beyond. In order to achieve long term transformative results, multilevel (local, subnational, national) efforts for conflict transformation have to be taken. In particular, any institutions or individuals assisting conflict transformation in REDD+ should work beyond just addressing conflict at the conflict party level (e.g. restoring parties’ relationship, reaching agreement), but also to include the context within which the conflict is situated. Some crucial background aspects here include politics, economic and development policies, land demands, land governance, tenure arrangements, and institutions. This effort will require long term engagement, trust building and cooperation between the government, communities and NGOs at local, subnational and national levels starting at the earliest stage of REDD+ development. This will also require the creation of the enabling environments at the policy level as well as strengthening (or even creating) a platform or bureau responsible for addressing grievances and transforming conflict at local and national levels to address these issues. Such mechanisms are required under various REDD+ program and initiatives such as UN-REDD+ programme and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).

REDD+ can and must be utilized as an opportunity to positively change outdated tenure policies and legal frameworks; to secure customary tenure rights, to develop and formalize grievance mechanisms; and to empower local rights holders to participate meaningfully in REDD+ decision-making and implementation. If complex tenure realities are ignored and the rights of rights holders are excluded, it is likely that REDD+ will face challenges in achieving its goals and establishing equitable benefit-sharing systems (Knox et al. 2011).

4.2 Recommendations

The findings of multiple sources of conflict suggest that there is no single approach or silver bullet in preventing and addressing conflict in the context of REDD+. Taking into account the lessons learned from the four countries studied, we offer the following recommendations for preventing and transforming conflict in REDD+ implementation (prioritizing the structural conflict causes set out in Figure 2):

- **Ensuring appropriate incentives are in place for the engagement and participation of local communities (e.g. Indigenous and forest dependent people) in REDD+ processes at the national and subnational levels.** These incentives would include supportive policies. Simultaneously, it is important that burdens in terms of consultations and other processes requiring community time and engagement are efficient and effective.

- **Ensuring that those who are dependent on forest resources and services for their livelihoods stand to benefit directly and on an ongoing basis from REDD+.** Local livelihood strategies should be integrated into REDD+ implementation as part of efforts to incorporate adaptation and resilience building strategies broadly within REDD+. REDD+ initiatives could place local livelihoods at risk unless they offer alternatives to local forest use (e.g. agriculture) which is the primary income source for many smallholders (Sills et al. 2014). REDD+ should not alienate or even jeopardize local livelihoods. Many studies (e.g. Yasmi et al. 2010) have shown that forest conservation will likely fail or create conflict when it fails to address local livelihood issues.
• **Ensuring effective development and implementation of REDD+ safeguards, particularly ensuring grievance redress and conflict transformation mechanisms exist, are clear and accessible.** It is also important to ensure that the key stakeholders have a mutual understanding on the grievance redress mechanisms in place (e.g. roles, responsibilities, coordination among different agencies).

• **Strengthening capacity of key REDD+ stakeholders to anticipate and address conflict, with a particular emphasis on government and project implementation partners, as well as local communities and their civil society representatives.** In particular by allocating budget and resource building capacity of REDD+ stakeholders at local and national levels on assessing, managing, documenting, reporting and evaluating conflicts (e.g. through training, knowledge exchanges).

• **Assessing, clarifying and reforming tenure arrangements over forests and forest-related land as needed, including accelerating participatory boundary demarcation and land use planning in REDD+ sites.** Tenure issues have been considered among the most important challenges by REDD+ proponents and there is much that remains to be done to assure an appropriate tenure foundation for REDD+ (Sills et al. 2014).

• **Developing, clarifying and providing sufficient information regarding benefit sharing mechanisms through participatory processes at local, subnational and national level, drawing on models and experiences piloted elsewhere.** Adequate representation of key stakeholders (recognition and procedural justice) in the process of designing and implementing this mechanism is also crucial to ensure acceptability of the mechanism and ensure that the benefits will go to the rights-holders.

• **Ensuring landscape level coordination between different government agencies and other stakeholders in REDD+ implementation and continuously ensuring full, fair, and equitable participation of local communities in the coordination mechanisms (e.g. MRV, BDS).** As REDD+ drivers lay outside the forest sector, it is critical that stakeholders from relevant departments including agriculture, trade, planning, finance and others are engaged.
5. CONCLUSIONS

This issue paper has demonstrated how some REDD+ projects are built upon the existing forest and forestland conflicts while REDD+ can introduce new source of conflict on the ground, particularly between forest communities, governments and other REDD+ project developers, as well as between communities themselves. The presence of conflicts over REDD+ implementation with different kinds of impairments, actors and sources suggests the necessity to develop mechanisms for effective grievance and conflict resolution mechanism that can respond to such dynamics. In this regard, conflict among different stakeholder groups has been acknowledged as one of the critical challenges in the implementation of REDD+, in which the issues relating to restricted access to forest resources, competing demands, benefit sharing as well as unclear tenure were the most common ones.

Whilst REDD+ is intended not only for reducing emissions but also for other co-benefits (e.g. poverty alleviation and securing rights and equity), this study shows that it is confronted with continued conflict due to the existence of impairments. One implication that can be drawn is that any REDD+ project should take into account the potential sources of impairment. Any REDD+ initiative is likely to create conflict if local communities (e.g. forest dependent people, Indigenous communities), for example, are impaired by the projects. The paper suggests that the REDD+ projects must address the conflict triggers to minimize conflict, and additionally include appropriate conflict transformation mechanisms as an integral part of their development and management. Finally, the paper also highlights the importance of strengthening capacity of key REDD+ stakeholders to manage the existing and future conflict in REDD+ implementation.

One of the areas that have not been covered by this study is the assessment of the institutional capacity of key REDD+ stakeholders in transforming forest and land conflict, with a particular emphasis on the capacity of government and project implementation partners. This made it difficult to determine, for example, the level of capacity of key stakeholders in managing conflict as well as what sort of skills, knowledge and resources for conflict transformation that are still lacking and need to be strengthened. Moreover, as some REDD+ projects covered in this study are still in their early development, follow up studies are needed in order to see whether some of the conflict issues mentioned in this study have been addressed and whether the missing conflict mechanisms are in place.
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